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ILLEGAL ALIENS: CAN MONETARY 
DAMAGES BE RECOVERED FROM 
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN UNDER AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE FOREIGN 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OR many years the United States (“U.S.”) has struggled 
with the high costs of illegal immigration, mounting to 
$5.4 billion in public assistance alone in 1990, according 
to one study.1  In response the federal government has re-
stricted social service and health care benefits paid to illegal 
aliens.2  Affected states, including Arizona,3 California,4 Flor-
  
 1. See DONALD HUDDLE , THE NET NATIONAL COSTS OF IMMIGRATION (Carry-
ing Capacity Network, 1993) [hereinafter HUDDLE REPORT].  Dr. Huddle, a 
Rice University economist, also concluded that in 1992 some 2.07 million 
American workers were displaced from jobs by immigrants, legal and illegal, 
costing $11.9 billion.  Id. at 1.  The study was commissioned by Carrying Ca-
pacity Network (“CCN”), a nonprofit organization that “works to increase un-
derstanding of the interrelated nature of environmental degradation, popula-
tion growth, resource conservation, and quality of life issues.”  Id. at 25.  Cop-
ies of the study are available from CCN, 1325 G Street N.W., Suite 1003, 
Washington, D.C. 20005–3104; Gayle Hanson, Illegal Aliens Strain an Ailing 
U.S. System; California Seeks Change in Federal Policies Requiring Health 
Care, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1994, at A5. 
 2. See Cynthia Webb Brooks, Comment, Health Care Reform, Immigra-
tion Laws, and Federally Mandated Medical Services: Impact of Illegal Immi-
gration, 17 HOUS. J. INT ’L L. 141, 145–47 (1994) (summarizing the history of 
immigration law and policy); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (Supp. II 1996)) [hereinafter IIRAIRA]. IIRAIRA strengthened 
border patrols, reformed exclusion and deportation laws, and increased penal-
ties for alien smuggling. Id. See also H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995) 
[hereinafter Omnibus Immigration Reform Bill]. 
 3. Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997). 
 4. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 1997). 
F 
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ida,5 New Jersey,6 New York,7 and Texas,8 have all sued the 
U.S. government seeking compensation for the fiscal burdens 
allegedly thrust upon them by the federal immigration policy.  
While these suits have failed, state and local officials continue 
to chide the federal government, one of whom called it a “dead-
beat dad” in its refusal to reimburse states for the costs gener-
ated by illegal aliens.9   
California10 responded with Proposition 187.11  This ballot ini-
tiative12 sought to report illegal aliens to the federal govern-
ment and deny them access to public benefits.13  It was swiftly 
blocked by an injunction.14 Other states, including Florida15 and 
Arizona,16 have considered similar measures, but none of these 
have succeeded. Some observers believe that these movements 
fail because of concerns over possible damages to trade rela-
tions.17  Yet such movements also simply do not play well in 
Peoria: many Americans frown upon denying services to illegal 
  
 5. Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334, 1335–36 (S.D. Fla. 1994), 
aff’d, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996). 
 6. New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 465 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 7. Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 8. Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 9. See Hanson, supra note 1. San Diego County Supervisor Brian Billbray 
made this comment. Id. 
 10. Out of an estimated 5 million illegal aliens within the U.S., 2 million, 
40%, reside in California. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Illegal 
Alien Resident Population Summary (1996), at 
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/illegals.htm (last modi-
fied Sept. 4, 2002). See also Shari Fallek, Comment, Health Care for Illegal 
Aliens: Why It Is a Necessity, 19 HOUS. J. INT ’L L. 951, 955 (1997). 
 11. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113, 114, 834b (Deering 1995) [hereinafter Propo-
sition 187]. 
 12. Proposition 187 passed by a margin of 59% to 41%. See League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 13. See Hanson, supra note 1. 
 14. See League, 908 F. Supp. at 763. Judge Mariana Pfaelzer of the Central 
District of California issued the injunction. Id. 
 15. See Rex Hogard, Backers File Illegal-Aliens Amendment with State, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 4, 1995, at C3. As in California, the supporters of the 
Florida measure called themselves the “Save Our State Committee.” Id. 
 16. See Terese Hudson, Cutting Off Care: California’s Drastic Reaction to 
Illegal Immigrants Doesn’t Play Well in Other States, HOSP. & HEALTH 
NETWORKS, June 20, 1995, at 36. 
 17. See id. 
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aliens despite their status.18 The problem nonetheless persists 
and continues to make headlines.19  
This Note will explore a possible solution, focusing on Mexi-
can illegal aliens within the U.S. as a paradigm.20 Part II will 
discuss the general history of immigration in the U.S. It will 
then consider the various efforts to curb illegal immigration. 
Part III will explore the different views of national sovereignty 
as they relate to the treatment of illegal aliens. It will survey 
Mexican views of illegal immigration and examine statements 
of Mexican government officials that may serve to encourage 
Mexican citizens to cross the border into the U.S. illegally. It 
will conclude that such statements might support an action 
against the Mexican government based on an interpretation of 
the “commercial activity exception” to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (“FSIA”). This Note will close with some 
thoughts on using the courts to deal with illegal immigration, 
and the value of this approach to contemporary global politics. 
II. IMMIGRATION AND ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE U.S. 
A. U.S. Immigration History and Policy 
In the beginning, there were few restrictions placed on immi-
gration into the U.S.,21 and these were usually short-lived.22  In 
  
 18. See Michael Miller, Anti-Illegals Law Mired in Court a Year , 
REUTERS, Nov. 12, 1995, LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUTERS File. Some 
groups contend that such legislation nourishes discrimination against Hispan-
ics. See, e.g., Hogard, supra note 15. 
 19. See, e.g., Ginger Thompson, Mexico President Urges U.S. to Act Soon on 
Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at A1. The Mexican President called for 
an agreement on the status of illegal aliens to be reached “before the end of 
this year [2001].” Id. 
 20. Although much of the data is outside the scope of this inquiry, see 
Jorge Durand et al., Mexican Immigration to the United States: Continuities 
and Changes; Statistical Data Included, LATIN AMERICAN RES. REV., Jan. 1, 
2001, at 107, for a detailed analysis of Mexican migration patterns, legal and 
illegal. For example, most migrants come from Western Mexico, primarily 
from the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Michoacan. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984). 
 22. See, e.g., Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); ch. 
58, 1 Stat. 579 (1798); ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) 
[hereinafter Acts].  The Acts were in force for only two years.  They gave the 
President power to expel suspect foreigners by executive decree.  President 
John Adams, however, used that power but twice, in the case of two Irish 
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1875, however, with accelerating immigration rates, Congress 
enacted the first immigration law.23 In 1882 Congress followed 
up with laws excluding criminals, indigents, and other undesir-
ables.24 It also imposed a head tax of 50¢ upon accepted immi-
grants.25 Then, in 1907, Congress commissioned the Dillingham 
Report (“the Report”) to study immigration.26 Many of the Re-
port’s recommendations were inserted into the Immigration Act 
of 1917, notably literacy requirements and the power to deport 
aliens convicted of specified offenses.27 During the 1920s a “na-
tional origins” system of quotas was instituted. 28 The Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA of 1952”) incorporated 
these quotas.29 Congress eventually replaced the national ori-
gins standard with a more neutral system, passing the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1965 (“INA of 1965”).30   
  
journalists.  See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 351 (1965). 
 23. Immigration Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 
1974) (forbidding the admission of convicts and prostitutes). 
 24. Immigration Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (repealed 
1974). 
 25. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 474 (Richard B. Morris ed. 1965). 
The head tax was imposed in 1882 as  well. It was subsequently raised to $2 
in 1903, and $4 in 1907. Id. 
 26. Dillingham Commission Report, S. Doc. No. 758, 61st Cong. (3d Sess. 
1911).  President Theodore Roosevelt appointed the members of the Commis-
sion which was chaired by Senator William P. Dillingham. The 42-volume 
Report was published in 1911.  See John A. Scanlan, Immigration Control and 
the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 864 n.24; RICHARD 
PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 74 (1965). 
 27. Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (repealed 1952). This 
legislation also prohibited immigration from a broader portion of Asia, and 
granted the Secretary of Labor power to admit immigrants who would nor-
mally be subject to automatic expulsion.  Id.  See also PLENDER, supra note 26, 
at 74. 
 28. See Webb Brooks, supra note 2, at 145 n.22 (citing Immigration Act of 
1921, ch. 8, § 2, 42 Stat. 5, 5–6; Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 
Stat. 152, 159–60. The quotas favored British immigrants and restricted those 
from Southern and Eastern Europe, and Asia). 
 29. Id. at 145 n.25 (citing Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) 
Act, Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C 
§§ 1101–1557 (1988)). 
 30. Id. at 146 n.26 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (amending certain portions of 
the 1952 Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1557 (1952)). This placed an annual ceiling 
and per-country restrictions on immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere. It 
subjected admission preferences to family ties.  Id. § 1205.  The limit on East-
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In 1978, responding to concerns over ballooning immigration, 
Congress created the Select Commission on Immigration and 
Refugee Policy (“the Commission”).31 The Commission’s findings 
influenced the comprehensive reform of immigration policy em-
bodied in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(“IRCA”).32 Notably, IRCA reflected growing concern over illegal 
aliens.33 It sought to eliminate enticements for undocumented 
workers to enter the U.S. and imposed stiff penalties on em-
ployers who knowingly hired illegal aliens.34 Indeed, by 1990 
the concern over illegal immigration had intensified to the point 
that the Commission recommended “closing the back door to 
undocumented/illegal migration, and opening the front door a 
little more to accommodate legal migration in the interests of 
this country.”35  
B. The Impact of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. 
This concern was plausible given evidence showing that ille-
gal aliens had exacted a high economic toll within the U.S.36 A 
study conducted by Rice University economist Dr. Donald Hud-
dle concluded that illegal aliens had cost taxpayers $5.4 billion 
in public assistance in 1990.37 He estimated that the 1992 ille-
gal alien population of 4.8 million had generated $11.9 billion in 
public assistance and displacement costs net from the taxes 
  
ern Hemisphere immigrants was 170,000, with the per-country cap of 20,000. 
Id. §§ 1151–1152.  Additionally, it imposed an annual limit of 20,000 on West-
ern Hemisphere immigration without regard to national origin.  Id. §1154. In 
1978, global per-country limits supplanted hemisphere ceilings. Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–412, § 1, 92 Stat. 907 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982) (amending the 1952 Act, § 201(a))). 
 31. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendment of  October, 5, Pub. L. 
No. 95–412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907, 907 (1978). 
 32. Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [here-
inafter IRCA]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. H.R. Rep. No. 101–723(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32, 33 (1990), reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6713. 
 36. See 139 CONG. REC. S11,996 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1993) (statement of 
Sen. Harry Reid, Democrat of Nevada). See also HUDDLE REPORT, supra note 
1. 
 37. See HUDDLE REPORT, supra note 1. 
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they contributed.38 More recent estimates have supported his 
findings, calculating the social services costs of illegal immigra-
tion at $24 billion.39 Dr. Huddle predicted that illegal aliens 
would displace millions of American jobs, generating costs in 
the hundreds of billions of dollars.40 While some researchers 
disagree,41 many have drawn similar conclusions.42 
Most of the illegal alien population is concentrated in a few 
states. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
estimates for 1996 were as follows: California, 2,000,000; Texas, 
700,000; New York, 540,000; Florida, 350,000; and Illinois, 
290,000.43 Over 40% of illegal aliens reside in California.44 To 
  
 38. See id. at 1. 
 39. The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast, June 20, 2002) 
(transcript # 062001cb.256) (on file with Journal). “[E]ach year, social services 
for illegal immigrants costs Americans $24 billion. If that money were reas-
signed, it could provide prescription drug relief to millions of older American 
citizens.” Id.  
 40. HUDDLE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. Dr. Huddle estimated the cost of 
job displacement between 1993–2002 would be $171.5 billion. He also con-
cluded that within that same time frame illegal aliens would cost some $221.5 
billion in public assistance and displacement expenses. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Juan O. Tamayo, U.S. Mexican Summit to Focus on Trade, 
UPI, May 29, 1981, LEXIS, Nexis Library,  UPI File. The Mexican President 
was planning to offer President Ronald Reagan the results of a 4-year study 
showing that illegal immigrants made a positive contribution to the U.S. 
economy. A Mexican official went on to state that illegal aliens pay taxes, use 
few tax-supported public services, and lower inflation because they work for 
low wages. Id. See also Patrick Lee, Studies Challenge View That Immigrants 
Harm Economy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1993, at A1. An Urban Institute study 
concluded both legal and illegal immigration help create jobs in urban areas. 
Id.  Furthermore, Dr. Huddle’s methodology has been questioned by, among 
others, Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute, and Jeffrey Passel and Michael 
Fix of the Urban Institute.  See Stats Spotlight, Statistical Controversies in 
Immigration Policy, at http://www.stats.org/spotlight /immigration.html (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2002). Recently, a RAND study argued that “in spite of their 
proliferation, recent studies on the net fiscal costs of immigration do not pro-
vide a reliable estimate of what those net costs are.” See Blake Harris, State 
and Federal Agencies Are Using a Variety of Technological Tools to Help Pre-
vent Illegal Immigrants from Obtaining Benefits to Which They Are Not Enti-
tled, available at http://www.interlog.com/~blake/soft.htm (Jan. 1997). 
 42. See Lee, supra note 41. A state survey of San Diego County concluded 
that illegal immigrants contributed $60 million in taxes, but cost the county 
$206 million, for a net drain of $146 million. Id. 
 43. See Illegal Alien, supra note 10. Rounding out the top ten states of 
residence: New Jersey (135,000); Arizona (115,000); Massachusetts (85,000); 
Virginia (55,000); and Washington (52,000). To gauge the increase, here are 
the 1994 INS figures for the top 3 states: California (1.6 million); New York 
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better appreciate California’s situation, consider the opinion of 
one scholar who claimed that California would have to build a 
new school each day to accommodate the daily arrival of illegal 
immigrant children.45 California authorities asserted that the 
state’s illegal alien population increases by nearly 125,000 per 
year, and that it would spend over $2 billion on federally man-
dated education and health care benefits, as well as incarcera-
tion in 1996.46 In California’s suit filed against the federal gov-
ernment to recover expenses, the costs were broken down as 
follows: $395 million in emergency medical care, $390 million 
for incarceration and parole supervision, and $1.5 billion for 
education.47 The complaint alleged that the federal immigration 
policy had produced these burdens, and therefore the state was 
entitled to monetary damages as well as declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.48 The complaint further alleged that the federal gov-
ernment had violated its duties under the Invasion and Guar-
antee Clauses of Article IV, § 4 of the U.S. Constitution, failing 
to shield California from invasion.49 The Court found this issue 
nonjusticiable under the guidelines of Baker v. Carr.50 Other 
  
(510,000); and Texas (405,000). See Deborah Sontag, 3 Governors Take Pleas 
to the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994, at B7. 
 44. See Hudson, supra note 16, at 38. 
 45. See Webb Brooks, supra note 2, at 156. 
 46. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 47. Id. at 1090 n.3. 
 48. Id. at 1089. A number of amici curiae briefs were filed on behalf of 
California, notably by some California and U.S. legislators, and by such 
groups as the Washington Legal Foundation, Allied Education Foundation, 
and the California Correctional Peace Officers Association.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 1090. 
 50. “Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue 
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-
ments by various departments on one question.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
217 (1962). 
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states have sued the federal government on similar grounds, 
but these efforts have also failed, as noted above.51  
California’s Proposition 187 is the most famous state re-
sponse to illegal aliens. It provided:  
The initiative provisions require law enforcement, social ser-
vices, healthcare and public education personnel to (i) verify 
the immigration status of persons with whom they come in 
contact; (ii) notify certain defined persons of their immigration 
status; (iii) report those persons to state and federal officials; 
and (iv) deny those persons social services, health care, and 
education.52 
The initiative drew sharp criticism and charges of racism.53 A 
federal district court quickly enjoined implementation of most of 
its provisions.54 Nonetheless, Proposition 187 illustrated the 
  
 51. See Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th  Cir. 1997), cert 
denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1095 
(9th Cir. 1997); Chiles v. United States, 874  F. Supp. 1334, 1335–36 (S.D. Fla. 
1994), aff’d, 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1188 (1996). 
 52. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 
755, 763 (C.D. Cal 1995).  See also Proposition 187, supra note 11. 
 53. See, e.g., PETER SALINS, ASSIMILATION, AMERICAN STYLE  6 (1997) (con-
tending that Proposition 187 proponents exploited deep-rooted xenophobia); 
Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an “Alien Nation:” Race, Immigration, and Immi-
grants, 7 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 113 (1996) (“The ability to achieve racial 
goals through facially neutral means makes it difficult to ascertain the extent 
to which racism influences the calls for restrictionist measures.”).  
 54. League, 908 F. Supp. at 753. Among the detractors was then Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas who said of Proposition 187: “The voices of intoler-
ance have returned.” See Mark Fineman, California’s Elections; Mexico As-
sails State’s Passage of Proposition 187, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at A28.  In 
light of this criticism, it is interesting to note that Mexico has its own illegal 
aliens. They are called los indocumendatos and work for wages far below the 
minimum in boiler-room factories, sweatshops, and on ranches. They are vic-
timized by corrupt employers, police, and local officials. Every year Mexico 
deports thousands of them, mostly Guatemalans, Hondurans, El Salvadorans, 
and other Central Americans who penetrate Mexico’s porous southern border 
seeking a better life. They are sometimes transported by smugglers for a fee. 
Given this, some have charged hypocrisy in the criticisms of the California 
initiative, such as those of President Ernesto Zedillo who called it a violation 
of Mexican human rights. “There is a double standard here,” said Luis Gon-
zalez Souza, a social science professor at Mexico City’s National Autonomous 
University of Mexico, “we are not respecting the human rights of these un-
documented immigrants in the same way we are demanding the U.S. to re-
spect the human rights of Mexicans.” See Mark Fineman, Mexico’s Migrant 
Policy Called A Harsher Proposition 187; Latin America: Critics Charge Casti-
gating California is Hypocritical. Government says it is Reviewing the Prob-
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gravity of concern over illegal immigration, and the extent to 
which that concern had captivated the American public.55 Citi-
zens of Florida56 and Arizona57 have contemplated similar meas-
ures, but their efforts have failed to gain support. These efforts, 
however, show the impact that the costs of illegal immigration 
have made on people from different parts of the U.S.  
There have also been vigorous congressional responses to il-
legal immigration. During the first session of the 103rd Congress 
in 1993, amid heated debates over the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) and health care, illegal immigra-
tion garnered its fair share of attention.58  In January of 1993, 
for example, Representative Al McCandless of California intro-
duced legislation to assign 12,000 Department of Defense work-
ers to help the INS and U.S. Customs Service conduct various 
  
lem, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at A1. See also James Smith, The Americas; A 
Weekly Look at People and Issues in Latin America; Migrants Targeted at 
Other Mexican Border; Plan Sends Illegals Back to the Country of Origin, 
NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 2001, at A18. In July 2001 Mexico instituted a repatriation 
initiative called Plan Sur, a border policy aimed at stemming the northward 
flow of illegals. Human rights organizations have criticized Plan Sur for 
largely the same reasons they have criticized American border control efforts, 
arguing it will lead would-be migrants to seek more dangerous routes or pay 
even more exorbitant fees to smugglers. Id. Cf. Hearing on H.R. 238, infra 
note 59; Border Arrests, infra note 66. 
 55. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC., supra note 36. In the words of Senator Reid: 
“The American people are demanding reforms that will restore order to an 
immigration system they perceive to be out of control.” Id. 
 56. See Hogard, supra note 15. The Florida group patterned itself after the 
California lobby, calling itself the “Save our State Committee.” It aimed at 
cutting off education, welfare, and other public services to illegal aliens. Al-
though the Florida Department of State approved the ballot proposal, the 
group did not garner the signatures needed to qualify for a spot on the ballot. 
Id. 
 57. See Hudson, supra note 16. A businessman promoted the Arizona cam-
paign, but was unable to secure enough support. Some attributed this failure 
to Arizona’s desire to increase trade with Mexico. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., H.R. 2757, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993) (bill to amend the Im-
migration and Nationality Act pertaining to alien smuggling); S. 457, 103d 
Cong.  (1st Sess. 1993) (bill to deny payment of federal benefits to illegal 
aliens); H.R. Con. Res.117, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993) (resolution to improve 
U.S./Mexican cooperation to control illegal immigration); S. 1351, 103d Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1993) (bill to fortify border security); H.R. 1031, 103d Cong. (1st 
Sess. 1993) (bill to provide improved enforcement of employer sanctions). This 
is not an exhaustive list. 
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border-control operations.59  In February of 1993, Nebraska 
Senator James Exon sponsored a bill to prohibit the direct 
payment of federal financial or unemployment benefits to illegal 
aliens.60 In that same month California Representative Anthony 
Beilenson proposed a bill to strengthen laws penalizing employ-
ers for hiring illegal aliens.61  Then, in 1997, Congress enacted 
the sweeping Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act (“IIRAIRA”).62  IIRAIRA increased the INS 
budget, added personnel, and gave INS agents greater author-
ity to repel illegal aliens.63  When Congress limited health care 
  
 59. H.R. 245, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993).  Border crossings between Mex-
ico and the U.S. cover a terrain of remote deserts and mountains that is diffi-
cult to traverse. In 1997, for example, there were 38 recorded migrant deaths 
in the Imperial Valley of southeast California. Thirty-seven died in that re-
gion in 1998. See Week in Review; Mexico, U.S. Clash Over Chiapas; PGJDF 
Rape Scandal, INFOLATINA S.A. DE C.V ., Aug. 2, 1998. See also U.S. Mexico to 
Meet on Border Safety, UPI, May 25, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis, UPI File. Border 
jumpers often hire guides known as “coyotes,” who are often unscrupulous. 
For instance, in late May, 2001, a coyote abandoned a group of 28 Mexicans as 
they trekked through a sun-baked desert in Arizona, in a region known as El 
Camino del Diablo, or “The Devil’s Path,” in 110°  heat. Fourteen died before 
the Border Patrol found the group. The Border Patrol, however, has improved 
the emergency medical training of its personnel and has focused more atten-
tion on movements in treacherous regions in response to such incidents.  Id.  
See also Alien Smuggler Enforcement Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 238 Before 
the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Rep. 
James E. Rogan of California).   
  Also, the immigrant smuggling business generates between $7 billion 
and $8 billion dollars per year. Aliens often pay thousands of dollars for pas-
sage, only to be robbed. Nonetheless, a recent study by the Southern Califor-
nia Association of Governments found that alien smugglers are often “let off 
with a slap on the wrist.”  Id. 
 60. S. 457, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993). 
 61. H.R. 1031, supra note 58 (requiring the U.S. Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to devise a fraud-resistant social security card).  Immigration 
agents have raided many establishments in a crackdown on hiring of illegals, 
levying heavy fines, as illustrated by the cases of Filiberto’s, a chain of 15 
Mexican-food restaurants in Arizona, and Pappas Partners, a Texas restau-
rant chain. After pleading guilty to concealing and harboring illegal aliens, 
Pappas paid a record $1.75 million fine. See Mark Shaffer and Chris Moeser, 
INS Shuts Valley Filiberto’s; 15 Cafes Raided in Probe on Illegal Immigration, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 18, 1997, at A1. 
 62. IIRAIRA, supra note 2. 
 63. See Jacob Bernstein, Welcome to America. Now Go Home; Granted 
Sweeping New Powers by Congress, the INS Is Quickly Earning a Global 
Reputation for Cruel and Capricious Conduct at Miami International Airport, 
MIAMI NEW TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, available at http//:www.miaminewtimes.com. 
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services to illegal aliens that same year,64 it affixed the follow-
ing statement to the legislation: “Current eligibility rules for 
public assistance and unenforceable financial support agree-
ments have proved wholly incapable of assuring that individual 
aliens not burden the public benefits system.”65  
The INS has also stepped up border security in targeted ar-
eas. In the San Diego and El Paso areas, for example, it insti-
tuted a program called “Operation Gatekeeper.”66  Operation 
Gatekeeper made 1,168 arrests in its first 24 hours.67  A similar 
program called “Operation Cochise” increased INS manpower in 
the Tucson area, using checkpoints, high-tech gadgetry, and 
undercover officers to catch illegal immigrants.68 In June of 
2000, Operation Cochise apprehended over 70,000 illegal border 
crossers.69 To better appreciate the magnitude of the border 
traffic, consider that the U.S. Border Patrol caught 623,672 
along the southwest border during the first half of 2002, captur-
ing 97,424 in May alone.70   
  
IIRAIRA sanctioned “expedited removal.” Under this procedure, INS officers 
at immigration checkpoints may summarily deny anyone whose papers or 
verbal responses are suspect. Previously, those deemed ineligible were al-
lowed to plead their cases before immigration judges. Id. 
 64. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607 
(Supp. II.1997)). 
 65. Id. at 2260. The statement  further asserted that: “[I]t is a compelling 
government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided 
by the availability of public resources.” Id.  
 66. See Border Arrests up as “Operation Gatekeeper” Begins, UPI., Oct. 2, 
1994, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The operation involved some 200 
agents. Id. See also Tim Vandenack, U.S. Stemming Illegal Immigration, 
UPI., Mar. 14, 1996, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The San Diego and El 
Paso regions had accounted for about 65% of all border crossings, but this was 
reduced to 44% according to then INS chief Doris Meissner. Of interest also, 
the Mexican overland route is used by immigrants from all over the world as a 
point of entry into the U.S.  Id. 
 67. Vandeneck, supra note 66. 
 68. See Scott Baldauf, After Being Overrun, Douglas Takes Back Its 
Community, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 17, 2000, at 3. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Immigration and Naturalization Services, Southwest Border Apprehen-
sions, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/ 
msrmay02/SWBORD.HTM (last modified July 5, 2002). Even so, this figure 
represents a decline in apprehensions of 32% compared with the same period 
in 2001.  Id. 
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Some American citizens and lawmakers have resorted to 
more radical solutions to the problems of illegal immigration.71 
In Douglas, Arizona, for example, ranchers mustered armed 
vigilante squads to capture undocumented immigrants.72 
What’s more, some lawmakers have proposed dramatic legisla-
tion such as moratoria on all immigration.73 Most responses, 
however, have been less controversial. They have generally 
sought to curb illegal border traffic and reduce the costs gener-
ated by illegal immigration.74  
The consumption of health care resources by illegal aliens has 
frequently augmented those costs. The migration of pregnant 
women from Mexico is illustrative.75 According to Sally Super, 
  
 71. See, e.g., Visa Cheats; Warning from U.S. Embassy, LATIN AMERICAN 
NEWSL., Mar. 21, 2000, at 3. 
 72. Id.  According to the Barnett family, which farms in the area, ranchers 
have been forced to take such action to defend their property against illegal 
aliens.  Id. 
 73. See Dena Bunis, Balance Stressed in Border Approach: Powell Tries to 
Lower Expectations for Meeting Between Bush and Fox, ORANGE COUNTY REG., 
Aug. 10, 2001, available at  2001 WL 9680585. Colorado Representative Tom 
Tancredo supports such a moratorium, stating: “[w]e must stop this unfet-
tered flow into our country or we will see irreversible damage done to our 
economic and social resources.”  Id.  
For an example of an immigration moratorium resolution, see  Immigration 
Moratorium Resolution, available at http://www.balance.org/cap/ 
legalimmindivres.html (last visited, Sept. 28, 2002). 
 74. See sources cited supra note 58. See also Stewart M. Powell and Dan 
Freedman, U.S. To Increase Work Permits, Bush Tells Mexico’s President, 
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 7, 2001, at A6. President Bush and Con-
gress members promised Mexican President Vicente Fox that they would try 
to expand a temporary-worker program to cover some of the 4½ million Mexi-
cans living and working in the U.S. illegally. The existing temporary-worker 
program operated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service admitted 
457,346 temporary workers from all countries in 1999, including 68,221 Mexi-
cans. Id. See also Dan Eggen and Darly Fears, Bush Weighs Legal Status of 
Mexicans; Illegal Immigrants May Get Residency, WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, 
at A1. In a joint effort to deal with the problem of Mexican illegal immigrants, 
the Bush Administration is considering granting legal residency status to 
millions of illegal aliens.  Id.  This amnesty proposal, however, is controver-
sial, but has many high-profile supporters like Arizona Senator John McCain. 
He said: “I believe these people are living here, and it’s [amnesty] a recogni-
tion of reality.”  On the other hand, Texas Senator Phil Gramm opposes such 
amnesty, while supporting temporary-worker status for Mexican laborers. See 
Fox News Sunday (Fox News television broadcast, July 15, 2001) (on file with 
Journal). 
 75. See Hanson, supra note 1. 
File: Turoff Base Macro  final.doc Created on: 10/30/2002 10:10 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM 
2002] ILLEGAL ALIENS 191 
director of the maternity pavilion at Sharp Chula Vista Hospi-
tal, an organized ring helps pregnant women cross the border 
where they can obtain costly medical care subsidized by Cali-
fornians.76 The story of Hermillo Meave shows how high those 
costs can climb.77 Meave was taken to Sharp Memorial Hospital 
in San Diego, in September of 1991.78 Although he was being 
transferred from a hospital in Tijuana, Mexico with a chronic 
heart condition, he supplied a San Diego address.79 Since he 
produced a California identification card and Medi-Cal number 
indicating eligibility for treatment under California’s health 
care system, a hospital-based Medi-Cal worker ruled that he 
could be admitted, meaning that most of his medical expenses 
would be covered by the state.80  
The day after Meave was admitted, surgeons implanted a 
pump to keep his heart beating until a donor heart could be 
found.81 During the five-month waiting period, suspicions of 
fraud arose.82 Despite these, Meave’s application for a heart 
transplant was approved, and he received his new heart in Feb-
ruary of 1992.83 Then the truth emerged: Meave actually lived 
in Tijuana, Mexico and was not eligible for a transplant.84 The 
bill came to $1 million;85 the taxpayers of California paid it.86 
  
 76. Id. Some officials contend that many are drawn by a California pro-
gram which spent $80,000 over a two year period on Spanish-language adver-
tisements, broadcast on Mexican radio and television, encouraging undocu-
mented pregnant women to seek prenatal care in California. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. The case of Rene Garcia offers another striking example of an ille-
gal alien defrauding the California healthcare system.  Rene Garcia was taken 
to Sharp Chula Vista Hospital with a severe heart condition, also in need of a 
transplant.  He produced documentation showing he was an American citizen, 
although he was not covered by insurance.  Garcia’s uncle took the case to the 
Legal Aid Society of San Diego, which castigated the Medi-Cal investigators 
for jeopardizing Garcia’s life.  When the application for Medi-Cal was proc-
essed, it was revealed that nine other individuals had used the same docu-
mentation. The patient was actually a Mexican national whose father and 
uncle had devised an elaborate scheme to procure a free heart transplant.  
The patient died three days after being hospitalized, leaving behind a 
 
File: Turoff Base Macro  final.doc Created on:  10/30/2002 10:10 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM 
192 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:1 
After a painstaking search for ways to lessen the costs of ille-
gal immigration, from rhetoric to referenda, from legislation to 
litigation, what other avenues should be explored? Perhaps the 
answer may be gleaned from late Florida Governor Lawton 
Chiles’s suit against the federal government over the issue: 
Governor Chiles did not want to deny public services to illegal 
aliens; he only wanted to compel the federal government to fund 
those services.87  
Can a similar approach be used to compel payment for the 
expenses generated by illegal aliens from their countries of ori-
gin? The remainder of this Note will review the pertinent areas 
of international law and explore the possibilities of such legal 
action using Mexico/U.S. as a paradigm. 
III. THE CASE FOR RESTITUTION OF HOST STATE BY ALIENS’ 
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN  
A. Illegal Immigration and International Law 
There are two principles that define the rights of sovereign 
nations to regulate the flow of alien immigration into their ter-
ritories:88 the principle of state sovereignty , which emphasizes 
national borders and allows the exclusion of aliens, and the 
principle of interdependence, which emphasizes the interrela-
tionship among nations and forbids the exclusion of aliens.89 
Several prominent European and Latin American jurists sub-
scribe to the principle of interdependence.90 Most Anglo-Saxon 
  
$200,000 medical bill. The state declined to accept responsibility for the bill, 
leaving the hospital to sue the family in the hope of recovery. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Hudson, supra note 16, at 38. 
 88. See PLENDER, supra note 26, at 61. 
 89. See id. Marcel Sibert asked whether there was a rule of international 
law requiring a State to admit aliens into its territory, replying as follows: 
“Pour résoudre cette question il a été fait appel à deux principes différents:1 au 
principe de la souveraineté des états, envisagé d’une manière absolue, ou bien 2 
au principe de leur interdépendence.” [resolving this question called for two 
distinct principles: (1) the principle of state sovereignty, deeming states sepa-
rate, and (2) the principle of their interdependence] (author’s translation).  Id. 
 90. Id.  Sibert believed this principle was at the root of article 13(2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which prescribes a right of return to 
one’s country.  Id.  See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th  Plen. Mtg. U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).    
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theorists, however, champion state sovereignty. 91 While the 
right to exclude aliens has not always been deemed a sine qua 
non of the state sovereignty principle, subscribing states have 
seldom felt obliged to admit aliens, except when compelled by 
human rights concerns.92 
In his seminal work on international law, Hugo Grotius ar-
gued that the defense of the persons or property of the sover-
eign’s subjects is a legitimate justification for war.93 From this 
proposition it follows that a sovereign might expel aliens to pro-
tect the personal or proprietary rights of its citizens.94 Grotius 
believed, however, that such expulsions without due care were 
barbarous, citing the authority of St. Ambrose to demonstrate 
that even famine did not justify the expulsion of aliens.95   
Building on the work of Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf adduced 
limits on a sovereign’s power to exclude aliens from its terri-
tory.96 Accordingly, sovereigns must admit aliens with lawful 
reasons to enter, such as commercial motives.97 Furthermore, 
once aliens are admitted, the sovereign must ensure their 
proper treatment.98   
  
 91. PLENDER, supra note 26, at 61. Prominent among these theorists are 
Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim and Robert C. de Ward. Id. 
 92. Id at 62. 
 93. Id. (citing  HUGO GROTIUS , DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS,  vol. II, ch. II, para. 
15 (1702)). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. Saint Ambrose was Bishop of Milan in the 4th century A.D. When 
Emperor Theodosius ordered the massacre of the people of Thessalonica after 
officers of an imperial garrison stationed within were murdered (A.D. 390), 
Ambrose demanded that the emperor do public penance, and the emperor 
obeyed, securing the bishop’s standing as a moral force. EDWARD GIBBON, 2  
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE  872–74 (Modern Library Edition 
1995) (1782). 
 96. Id. (citing PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM , LIBRI OCTO 354 
(C. Oldfatter trans., 1934).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. Pufendorf sought to achieve a balance between the notions of free-
dom of movement and sovereignty, and distilled the following rule: “every 
state may reach a decision according to its own usage on admission of foreign-
ers who come to it for reasons other than are necessary and deserving of sym-
pathy; only no-one can question the barbarity of showing indiscriminate hos-
tility to those who come on peaceful missions.”  Id. at 64.  Immanuel Kant 
adopted Pufendorf’s thesis in his international law treatise, Perpetual Peace, 
where he defined hospitality as the right of a foreigner not to be treated hos-
tilely simple because he entered a foreign land. Nonetheless, Kant believed 
that foreigners could not claim the right to be guests, but only visitors, since a 
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Sir William Blackstone summarized the basic principles of 
sovereignty as follows: “by the law of nations no member of one 
society has the right to intrude into another . . . .  [Neverthe-
less] great tenderness is shown by our laws . . . with regard to 
the admission of strangers who come spontaneously . . . they are 
under the king’s protection.”99 British jurisprudence adopted 
this view,100 as did that of the Continent101 and Canada.102 
American jurisprudence has also adopted this view, as em-
phasized by an opinion of the Solicitor for the U.S. State De-
partment in 1909.103  In that year, the Solicitor considered Ec-
uador’s refusal to admit a Chinese-American laborer.104  In light 
of a sovereign nation’s “undoubted right” to exclude aliens, he 
could find no basis to object to Ecuador’s decision to exclude the 
American citizen.105  
American case law has incorporated this view of sovereignty 
as well.106 In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, Justice Horace 
Gray held:  
  
special treaty would be needed to create the status of guest or invitee with 
“freedom of the house.” Id. In his treatise, Le Droit De Gens, Emeric de Vattel 
declared that a sovereign could deny entrance to foreigners in certain cases, 
such as when the welfare of the state was imperiled. Id. 
 99. Id. (alteration in source). 
 100. Id. at 70–72 (citing Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy,  [1991] A.C. 272 
(1891) (U.K.), and Montague Crackenthorpe who wrote in 1892: “it can hardly 
by disputed that every civilized State is entitled to make what regulations it 
pleases both as to emigration from, and immigration into its territory.”) Id. 
 101. See id at 72. The German scholar P. Heilborn saw a close analogy be-
tween individual proprietary rights and a state’s territorial sovereignty rights. 
Id. Speaking of the admission of aliens,  Frederic de Martens said: “Chaque 
état, en vertu de son omnipotence à l’intérieur, a le droit indubitable de fixer les 
conditions auxquelles il les admet sur son territoire.” Id. [each state has an 
indubitable right to set the conditions under which it admits them [aliens] 
into its territory by virtue of its control of internal affairs] (author’s transla-
tion). 
 102. Id. at 71, (citing Attorney-General for Canada v. Cain, and Attorney-
General for Canada v. Gilhula, [1906] A.C. 542 (1891) (U.K.), which upheld 
Canada’s Alien Labor Act of 1897. The Committee deciding the case held: “by 
the law of nations the supreme power in every State has the right to make 
laws for the exclusion . . . of aliens.”)  
 103. Id. at 73. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
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It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sover-
eign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and es-
sential to its self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of for-
eigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such 
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.107 
What’s more, this view has been reaffirmed in more recent 
cases.108 Thus, although the opposing viewpoint advocating free 
movement based upon the interdependence principle has gained 
acceptance,109 the state sovereignty principle has far deeper 
roots in American jurisprudence.110  
Nonetheless, Proposition 187-type legislation may violate the 
sovereignty principle’s inherent duties to treat illegal aliens 
properly.111 Indeed, such legislation aims at denying social ser-
vices, health care, and education to illegal aliens. Such services 
are arguably necessary to ensure their proper treatment.112 
Since increasingly large numbers of migrants are seeking en-
trance into industrialized countries, and will continue to engen-
der substantial social and economic costs, affected nations will 
inevitably face questions concerning the treatment of mi-
grants.113 Sovereignty issues will loom large within these ques-
tions. Moreover, it is unlikely that Proposition 187-type initia-
tives will ever garner international approval114 despite the mer-
  
 107. Id. Justice Gray cited Vattel to support this proposition. See supra text 
accompanying note 98. 
 108. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 559 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (holding that the 
power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign right); United States ex rel 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“An alien who seeks admis-
sion to this country may not do so under any claim of right.”). 
 109. See PLENDER, supra note 26, at 61. In 1906, Dionisio Anzilotti stated 
the principle of free movement firmly: “[I]l existe pour les états une obligation 
juridique d’admettre les étrangers sur leur territoire.” Id at 72 [sovereign 
states have a legal duty to admit foreigners into their lands] (author’s transla-
tion). 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 103; Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 98, 99. 
 112. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 
755, 763 (S.D. Cal. 1995). See also supra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
 113. See, e.g., Richard Bordreaux, 30,000 Join Genoa March for “Global 
Village” Sans Borders, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A10 (noting the skittish-
ness toward migration issues in developed countries).    
 114. See El Salvador’s President Calderon Welcomes Summit Results, BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts (Radio El Salvador), Dec. 16, 1994, LEXIS, 
nexis Library, BBC File. President Armando Calderon Sol noted that rejection 
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its of their motives.115 Thus, it is worthwhile to consider other 
methods of dealing with illegal aliens that better comport with 
the duties and obligations embedded in the state sovereignty 
principle. 
B. Alternative Methods of Dealing with the Burdens of Illegal 
Aliens 
A good place to start is with a program instituted by the U.S. 
in 1996 to return Mexican illegal aliens to Mexico.116 Under this 
plan, the U.S. government pays the airfare from San Diego to 
airports close to the migrant’s home in Mexico.117 This program 
was designed to ensure that returnees would not attempt re-
entry, since it conveyed them home rather than depositing them 
at the border where the temptation to re-cross is heightened.118  
In 1996 Congress earmarked $5 million for the program, and 
according to INS spokesman Greg Gagne, the program was ex-
pected to return 5,000 illegal immigrants by the end of that 
year.119 According to Gagne, while the U.S. would pay the air-
fare, Mexico would cover the costs after the returnee landed.120 
Although this is a small-scale operation,121 it represents an 
imaginative  approach to dealing with illegal immigration. It 
  
of the notion of Proposition 187 “has come not only from the United States, 
but from outside the United States; that is, from the world.” Id. See also David 
Welna, Leaders at Miami Conference Discuss Divisive Issues, Weekend Edi-
tion, (NPR broadcast, Dec. 10, 1994) (transcript # 1101–13) (on file with Jour-
nal). Mexico’s expected response to Proposition 187 was noted. Id.  
 115. See generally HUDDLE REPORT, supra note 1 for insights into the finan-
cial motivations. See also Hanson, supra note 1. 
 116. See Phillip True, 13 Undocumented Immigrants Flown Home in New 
Program, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 5, 1996, at A14. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. To qualify for this program, an undocumented Mexican must be at 
least 18 years of age, must have been arrested at least once by INS authori-
ties, and must have no other record with U.S. law enforcement. A Mexican 
travel agency would make the air travel arrangements using Mexican carriers 
so that the returnees would be dealt with exclusively by Mexican officials on 
Mexican territory.  What’s more, those flown home through this program are 
not required to pledge that they will not try to enter the U.S. again, nor are 
they to be specially punished if they do so. Id. 
 120. Id. The Mexican Foreign Minister disputed the contention that Mexico 
would pick up the tab once on the ground. Id.  
 121. Id. The INS expected to return 150 aliens in a three-month period and 
then increase the number to roughly 420 per month until the end of 1996. Id. 
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also contains the thought-provoking idea of having Mexico bear 
some of the costs resulting from Mexican illegal immigration in 
the U.S.122 This suggests at least the notion of a demand that 
Mexico defray other costs associated with Mexican illegal aliens 
crossing into the U.S. 
Traditionally any such demand might sound in tort if it in-
volved private parties, under the doctrine of negligence: an ac-
tor responsible for harming a party, in breach of a duty, is 
obliged to pay damages for the harm caused.123 This principle is 
accepted by legal systems worldwide and is thus a proper basis 
for legal action under international law.124 Indeed, international 
law can derive from “customary law,”125 and the tort concept of 
negligence, embraced by the civil and common law alike, cer-
tainly qualifies as customary law.  
  
 122. Id. As noted, the Mexican Foreign Minister disputed this contention. 
See supra note 120. Nonetheless, the idea of Mexico bearing some of the costs 
is presented, at least through the words of the INS spokesman. 
 123. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §30, at 164–65 
(5th ed. 1984). There are four elements necessary to satisfy a cause of action 
in negligence: (1) A duty or obligation recognized by law [in this case, that 
duty would be for government officials to refrain from encouraging the breach 
of another nation’s sovereign rights to frame laws, to wit, the immigration 
laws of the U.S.]; (2) a breach of that duty [here, the statements made by 
Mexican government officials which arguably have encouraged the breach of 
those immigration laws]; (3) a reasonably close causal link between the con-
duct and the resulting injury [here, the legitimizing force that affirmative 
comments by Mexican government officials have on the design of border 
jumpers to in fact breach American immigration laws]; and (4) actual loss or 
damage to the interests of others [here, it would be the financial and social 
strains placed upon the American taxpayer in funding the outlays to social 
welfare programs necessitated by Mexican illegal aliens within the U.S.] Id. 
 124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102 
(1987).  For a discussion of the evolution of negligence in the common law, see 
John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 320–
25 (1894). For a discussion of negligence in Roman Law, the antecedent of the 
civil law system, see FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW  572–73 (1969).  
Actions for compensation in Roman Law were at first penal. Interestingly, 
these penal actions served as models for legislators under Edward I, enshrin-
ing them within the common law, and illustrating the nexus between the two 
great legal systems. See id. at 574. See also Thomas Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2001) for a compendious treatment of the Roman 
Law development of negligence principles and their incorporation into the 
civilian tradition. 
 125. RESTATEMENT, supra note 124, § 102(1)(a). 
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C. Sovereign Immunity 
Nonetheless, when dealing with sovereign states tort law is 
fettered by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.126  In the U.S. 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity stems from the 1812 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision of Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.127 
In Schooner Exchange Chief Justice Marshall held that the U.S. 
had waived jurisdiction over the activities of foreign sovereigns 
based on the principle of comity among nations.128 This is called 
the “absolute theory of sovereign immunity,” and pays homage 
to the ancient notion that the king could “do no wrong.”129  The 
principle of absolute sovereign immunity was wrought in an age 
when the exercise of judicial authority by one sovereign over 
another represented belligerence or the presumption of superi-
ority.130  Yet even after that age passed, courts retained abso-
lute sovereign immunity to avoid embarrassing those charged 
with conducting foreign affairs.131  Over time, however, as gov-
ernments started to engage in activities hitherto performed 
solely by private individuals, many nations began to contem-
plate a more restrictive doctrine.132 
This trend was apparent during the International Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Immunity 
State-Owned Vessels in 1926 (“Brussels Convention”).133  The 
Brussels Convention limited sovereign immunity for state-
controlled enterprises to ships used exclusively for non-
commercial endeavors.134   
Although the U.S. did not participate in the Convention, after 
World War II it too began to restrict sovereign immunity 
  
 126. Schooner Exch. v McFadden, 11 U.S. 116, 138 (1812). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 136. 
 129. Victory Transp. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 354 (2d Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). 
 130. See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. State-Owned Ships Convention, Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199. An 
English translation of the Convention may be found in ALLEN, THE POSITION 
OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS  303–308 (1933). See also Victory 
Transp., 336 F.2d at 357 n.5 for excerpts of the Convention. 
 134. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 358. 
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through negotiated treaties.135  Then, in 1952, in a letter from 
Jack Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Acting Attorney General 
Phillip Perlman, the U.S. State Department (which had usually 
requested immunity for all actions against friendly sovereigns) 
adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in ear-
nest.136 After several years and much criticism,137 Congress fi-
nally addressed the issue of sovereign immunity, enacting The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in 1976.138 
D. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
During the post Tate Letter period, foreign governments cus-
tomarily submited requests for sovereign immunity to the U.S. 
Department of State, a procedure that drew harsh criticism.139 
In response, the State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser 
began holding quasi-judicial hearings to determine whether 
immunity claims comported with the prescriptions of the Tate 
Letter. Often, however, foreign policy concerns supervened, 140 
and uncertainty resulted.141 This prompted congressional re-
view, and culminated in the passage of the FSIA in 1976, now 
  
 135. The U.S. drafted 14 treaties restricting sovereign immunity between 
1948 and 1958. Id. 
 136. Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486–87 (1983). See 
also Letter from Jack Tate Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to the 
Acting Att’y Gen. Philip Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T. ST. 
BULL. 984–985 (1952) and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v Cuba, 425 U.S. 
682, 711 (1976) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. “It will therefore be the Depart-
ment’s policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the 
consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign im-
munity.” Id. The kernel of this restrictive theory may be gleaned from the 
dictum of Schooner Exch., contemplating the possibility of a prince’s private 
property being subject to territorial jurisdiction, since, in that case he would 
have assumed “the character of a private individual . . . ” Schooner Exch.,11 
U.S. at 145. 
 137. See, e.g., Michael H. Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff De-
serves A Day In Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608, 608 (1954). 
 138. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 
2892 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 
1602–11 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)) [hereinafter FSIA]. 
 139. See Cardozo, supra note 137. 
 140. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, SA, 295 F.2d 24, 25 (4th Cir. 1991) (con-
sidering the Cuban Revolution). 
 141. See id. 
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the sole means of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign 
in the U.S.142 
The FSIA grants foreign nations general immunity from the 
courts of the U.S. and the several states, subject to exceptions, 
thus embodying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.143 
Section 1605 lists the exceptions: waiver, 144 commercial activ-
ity,145 property taken in violation of international law,146 rights 
of property in the U.S. arising out of succession or gift,147 claims 
for money damages or losses caused by the tortious acts or 
omissions of sovereign states or their agents, except those based 
on the performance of discretionary functions,148 actions to en-
force agreements,149 and terrorism or extra-judicial killing.150  
E. FSIA Commercial Activity Exception 
The “commercial activity” exception is one of the FSIA’s most 
frequently invoked exceptions, denying sovereign immunity 
when: 
[T]he action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in 
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act per-
formed in the United States in connection with a commercial 
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside 
the territory of the Unites States in connection with a com-
mercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States.151 
In other words, there must be a nexus between the commercial 
activity of the foreign state and the U.S. in order to establish 
subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.152  
  
 142. 28 U.S.C. § 1330.  The FSIA was enacted “to provide when and how 
parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the 
courts of the United States and to provide when a foreign state is entitled to 
sovereign immunity.”  H.R. REP. NO. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6604, 6604. 
 143. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
 144. Id. § 1605(a)(1). 
 145. Id. § 1605(a)(2) 
 146. Id. § 1605(a)(3). 
 147. Id. § 1605(a)(4). 
 148. Id. § 1605(a)(5). 
 149. Id. § 1605(a)(6). 
 150. Id. § 1605(a)(7). 
 151. Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 152. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1991).  
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Subsection 1603(d) offers some guidance in determining what 
constitutes “commercial activity” for the purposes of this excep-
tion.153  It embraces both ongoing activity as well as single 
commercial transactions.154  Furthermore, the commercial char-
acter of the conduct should be determined by the nature of the 
conduct rather than by reference to its purpose.155 The FSIA, 
nonetheless, does not define “commercial activity.” Indeed, Con-
gress deliberately left the term open, letting the courts deter-
mine “on a case by case basis . . . the distinction between com-
mercial and governmental.”156  Thus, case law has interpreted 
the meaning of commercial activity. 157 Accordingly, the contrac-
tual relations found in common business transactions are con-
sidered paradigmatic commercial activity.158  This comports 
with the FSIA’s legislative history as embodied in a House Re-
port that concluded that a contract or series of contracts for the 
purchase of goods was commercial activity per se.159  Put sim-
ply, when a government acts like a private person it forfeits 
sovereign immunity. 
This Note contends that certain statements of Mexican gov-
ernment officials regarding the illegal migration of Mexican 
citizens into the U.S. may be deemed commercial activity under 
the FSIA commercial activity exception.  This could expose the 
Mexican government to the jurisdiction of the courts of the U. S. 
and individual states.160  As noted above, the exception was de-
signed to lift the barriers of sovereign immunity when a gov-
ernment or its agents acted like a private person.161  The ani-
mating spirit, evident from Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum in 
  
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 
300, 308–9 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). 
 157. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Westover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 617 
(1992); Gemini Shipping Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org., 647 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 
1981); Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982). 
 158. Gemini Shipping, 647 F.2d at 309. 
 159. Id. 
 160. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 161. The quintessential example of private-person activity is when the sov-
ereign enters into contractual relations. See Gemini Shipping, 647 F.2d at 
309. 
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Schooner Exchange,162 suggests that the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity does not extend such immunity to activities 
inherent in the normal course of business. This allows the ex-
ception to encompass many activities involved in the conduct of 
business.  By this rationale, promotion of an activity from which 
a government can profit monetarily may be construed as com-
mercial activity under the FSIA commercial activity exception. 
Indeed, private persons often engage in such promotion-profit 
regimens.  Thus, why should a government engaging in the 
same type of private-person (promotion-profit) activity be im-
mune from legal action if the rationale for the restrictive theory 
of sovereign immunity is to insulate a government only when it 
acts in the public character of a sovereign?  In theory it should 
not.  Therefore, a suit based on the promotion-profit interpreta-
tion of FSIA commercial activity is consistent with the congres-
sional intent to leave the interpretation of FSIA commercial 
activity to judicial gloss.163  
Applying the promotion-profit interpretation of commercial 
activity to Mexico, the promotion is the encouragement by 
Mexican government officials of Mexican citizens to cross the 
border illegally into the U.S. The Monetary profit generated is 
the transfer payments sent from the U.S. to Mexico by illegal 
aliens.  These payments generate some $6 billion per year, ac-
cording to recent estimates.164  Indeed, such transfer payments, 
inuring to the benefit of the Mexican government as economic 
stimuli, are the third largest source of foreign revenue in Mex-
ico, behind tourism and oil.165  If the promotion-profit interpre-
tation of commercial activity were applied, these facts might 
expose the Mexican government to liability for the costs gener-
ated in the U.S. by Mexican illegal immigration, if it could be 
shown that the Mexican government was promoting that migra-
tion.166 
The next section will canvass Mexican views of illegal immi-
gration.  It will then examine evidence suggesting that the 
  
 162. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
 163. Gemini Shipping, 647 F.2d at 308–09. 
 164. Michael Janofsky, Immigrants Flood Border in Arizona, Angering 
Ranchers, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000, § 1, at 1. 
 165. Id. 
 166. For the costs generated, see supra Part II.B. 
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Mexican government has promoted the migration of illegal 
aliens into the U.S. 
F. Mexican Views of Illegal Immigration; Mexican Promotion of 
Illegal Immigration into the U.S.  
Mexican and American views of illegal immigration differ 
greatly.  This section will explore the differences. It will focus 
on these different views as expressed in statements made by 
Mexican government officials. It will divide these statements 
into three categories: (1) statements suggesting that undocu-
mented Mexican immigrants in the U.S. are not there illegally; 
(2) statements that justify the presence of undocumented immi-
grants in the U.S., claiming they are beneficial or necessary to 
its economy; and (3) statements that encourage Mexican to 
cross the border into the U.S.  All of these statements are con-
sidered as evidence to support a claim against the Mexican gov-
ernment under the promotion-profit interpretation of the FSIA 
commercial activities exception. 
The fundamental difference between American and Mexican 
notions of immigration is embodied in the Mexican Constitu-
tion.167 Article 11 of the Mexican Constitution provides: “Any 
man has the right to enter into the Republic [of Mexico], exit 
said Republic . . . without a passport . . . or any similar require-
ments.”168  Hence, unlike the U.S., Mexico does not require its 
citizens to have documentation to travel abroad.169  Thus, Mex-
ico eschews the American definition of “illegal immigration,” 
since that definition is based on a lack of documentation.170  In 
contrast, such deficiency conforms to Mexican law.171  The Mexi-
can view considers undocumented immigrants within the U.S. 
to be “migratory workers” or “undocumented aliens,” denying in 
essence that they have entered the U.S. illegally. 172   
  
 167. MEX. CONST. art. XI.  See also Jorge A. Vargas, Recent Development: 
Consular Protection to Illegal Migratory Workers and Mexican Undocumented 
Minors: Two Sensitive Issues Addressed by the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of 
the United States-Mexico Binational Commission , 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL ’Y 
143, 157 (1996). 
 168. Id. at 157 n.67 (citing the Mexican Constitution) (alteration in source). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 157. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. Disputes over definitions have been great stumbling blocks among 
negotiating parties.  Parties have often been unable to surmount the semantic 
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What’s more, Mexican government officials believe that ef-
forts to curb northward migration violate their citizens’ 
rights.173  Indeed, in response to California Governor Pete Wil-
son’s suggestion that Mexico should try to stem the flow of ille-
gal immigration, Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary Fer-
nando Solana stated that any such efforts would violate the 
Mexican Constitution.174  “In our country,” said Solana, “there is 
absolute freedom of travel; we can leave our territory whenever 
we want and enter it whenever we decide to.”175 In a public 
statement addressing Wilson’s comments concerning such 
Mexican efforts, Solana declared: “The proposal you make that 
Mexico help impede the flow of persons toward our border is 
unacceptable.”176 Solana noted “our” [the Mexican] border while 
failing to recognize its shared nature with the U.S. This omis-
sion arguably displayed an indifference to notion of illegal bor-
der crossing consistent with the Mexican view.177  
The statements of other Mexican government officials also 
convey a belief that Mexican citizens entering the U.S. without 
documentation are not doing so illegally.178  Mexican President 
Vicente Fox said: “It isn’t fair to consider them [Mexican Illegal 
  
differences to get to the actual problem.  It is interesting to note that despite 
the denial that undocumented Mexican migrants are within the U.S. illegally, 
Mexican officials have not hesitated to apply the term “illegal” to unwanted 
foreign nationals within Mexico.  When, for example, two U.S. diplomats were 
detained by villagers in Los Platanos, in the Chiapas state where the Zapa-
tista rebellion was active, the president of Mexico’s Institutional Revolution-
ary Party, Mariano Palacios Alcocer said “they [the U.S. diplomats] were in 
the country in an illegal way.”  Apparently their presence within the troubled 
region was sufficient to warrant the term “illegal.” Mexico, U.S. Clash, supra 
note 59. 
 173. Ginger Thompson, U. S. and Mexico Meet on Joint Migration Issues , 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at A4. 
 174. Governor Wilson made these suggestions during the initial proposals 
that spawned Proposition 187. Patrick J. McDonnell, Mexico Rebukes Wilson 
Over Immigration Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at A1. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. (emphasis added).  Wilson wrote letters to President Salinas of 
Mexico, urging the Mexican government to help in stemming the tide of illegal 
immigrants. During a visit to the border at San Diego, he said that Mexican 
authorities could “shoo away” approaching border jumpers. This suggestion 
was dismissed in Mexico as an infringement of citizens’ rights to exit the 
country.  Id.   
 177. See Vargas, supra note 168. 
 178. See Mexico Leader Wants Immigrants Made Legal, AUGUSTA CHRON., 
July 29, 2001, at A2. 
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aliens within the U.S.] illegal when they are employed, when 
they are working productively, when they are generating so 
much for the American economy . . . [t]hey shouldn’t have to 
walk around like criminals or stay hidden.”179  In a more recent 
interview, President Fox was more emphatic: “They are not il-
legals.  They are not illegals.  They are people that come there 
[to the U.S.] to work, to look for a better opportunity in life. . . 
.”180  Similarly, at a conference discussing U.S. immigration pol-
icy held in San Antonio, Texas, Mexican Foreign Minister Enri-
que Loaeza justified the status of illegal aliens within the 
U.S.:181  “They [Mexican illegal aliens] don’t come to the U.S. to 
break the law; they don’t come to the U.S. to commit crime.”182  
This contrasts with the American position that regards border 
crossings without valid documentation as crimes per se.183  
Mexican government officials have also indicated an unwill-
ingness to accept the American view of border policy.184  For ex-
ample, Mexican Foreign Secretary Jose Angel Gurria stated 
that Mexican officials were warning people about the dangers of 
crossing the border, putting them on notice about the perils 
they might encounter. 185  Fernando Solis Camera, head of Mex-
ico’s Population and Migratory Services department of the Inte-
rior Secretariat, announced that Mexican citizens would not be 
deterred from illegally crossing the border into the U.S.186  
While Mexican officials contended that these statements were 
taken out of context, those officials ultimately justified the 
  
 179. Id. According to the Mexican magazine Cambio, the Fox government is 
hiring three firms to work on the migration issue. See Susan Ferriss, Fox 
Scouting “Creative” Immigration Solutions, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Sept. 4, 
2001, at A1. 
 180. Hannity & Colmes, (Fox News television broadcast, Mar. 26, 2002) 
(transcript # 032601cb.253) (on file with Journal). 
 181. See Carmini Danini, Border Policy Eyed by Officials of Mexico, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 29, 1997, at B1. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., IIRAIRA supra note 2. 
 184. See Mexico’s Blind Spot Deadly, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 26, 
1998, at B4.  
 185. See Mexico Doubling Consular Staff, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN , 
Sept. 3, 1997, at A18.  
 186. See Mexico’s Migration Chief Criticizes U.S. Policy, INFOLATINA S.A. DE 
C.V., Mar.12, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All. 
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statements by arguing that they were based on the Mexican 
Constitution’s freedom of movement guarantees.187  
Mexican government officials have been justifying the status 
of Mexican illegal aliens in the U.S. for many years.  In 1981, 
for example, a Mexican official said that then Mexican Presi-
dent Lopez Portillo would try to impress President Ronald 
Reagan with the results of a Mexican study showing that illegal 
immigration contributed to the American economy.188  Speaking 
at the above-mentioned San Antonio conference, Mexican For-
eign Minister Loaeza declared that undocumented Mexican mi-
grants go to the U.S. motivated by a desire to benefit the com-
munities where they find work.189  This view is widely accepted 
throughout Mexico.190  Furthermore, Mexican officials have of-
ten argued that the U.S. needs Mexican laborers to do the work 
that natives shun.191  Indeed, Mexican Foreign Relations Secre-
tary Fernando Solana noted the contributions that illegal im-
migrants made to California’s economy when he chided Gover-
nor Pete Wilson over Proposition 187.192 
Mexican officials have also frequently adverted to the pres-
sures that their returning nationals would impose on Mexico’s 
economy.193  This was particularly prevalent after the passage 
of Proposition 187.194  Speaking of the Proposition’s effects, En-
rique del Val, Undersecretary of Regional Development, said 
there would be a major impact on the economy of several Mexi-
  
 187. Id. 
 188. See Tamayo, supra note 41. 
 189. See Danini, supra note 182.  “They [undocumented Mexican migrants] 
come to work and, through their work, to contribute to the prosperity of the 
communities where they reside.”  Id. 
 190. See Vandenack, supra note 66. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See McDonnell, supra, note 175. “The place that California occupies in 
the world . . . is due in large part to the efficient, responsible and often under-
paid work of Mexicans.  The enormous contribution that Mexicans have made 
to the state of California throughout history should not be lost sight of.”  Id.  
He added: “In the specific case of migratory workers, regardless of the type of 
work they do, they undoubtedly fill a role that the United States has not been 
able to satisfy.”  Id.  
 193. See Mark Fineman, California Election; Mexico Assails Passage of 
Proposition 187; Immigration: Officials Say Measure ‘Tramples’ Human 
Rights and Commentators Call it ‘Racist.’ But President Salinas Stresses that 
it Does Not Represent the Position of the U.S. Government, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 1994, at A28. 
 194. Id. 
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can states if Mexican illegal aliens returned home.195  “We are 
worried,” said del Val, “Because if these services are denied 
them there, they will come back.”196  Many responses, however, 
were not so temperate.  For example, in protest over Proposition 
187, an angry mob vandalized a McDonald’s restaurant in Mex-
ico City’s Zona Rosa District.197  Also, given the Mexican gov-
ernment’s blistering condemnation of American internal mat-
ters as embodied in Proposition 187 it is interesting to note its 
response to a U.S. Senate proposal criticizing Mexico’s handling 
of the Zapatista rebellion.198  The Mexican Foreign Secretariat 
was incensed, characterizing any such resolution as “unaccept-
able interventionism.”199 
Thus, the Mexican view of illegal immigration in the U.S. 
consists of four facets: (1) the Mexican Constitution’s guarantee 
of free exit for its citizens without requiring documentation;200 
(2) declarations of Mexican government officials that undocu-
mented Mexicans are not in the U.S. illegally;201 (3) statements 
by Mexican officials that encourage border crossings into the 
U.S. or denigrate attempts to thwart them; 202 and (4) justifica-
  
 195. Id. 
 196. Baja California, Michoacan, Zacatecas, and Guerrero are among the 
states that would be affected by this influx.  Id.  In anticipation of Proposition 
187, Mexico’s Secretary of Public Education, Jose Angel Pescador Osuna said 
his ministry was “taking measures to know how many children will be af-
fected, which is the demand we now would have to fulfill, particularly in the 
border states.”  Among the projects considered were large public works pro-
grams to provide jobs for returning workers, using them to build hospitals and 
schools needed for their families, supporting the same needs denied by the 
California initiative. Commenting on Proposition 187, Mexican President 
Salinas asked: “What will happen to the children? Will they return to Mexico? 
Wash windshields in California? Sell newspapers on the streets or beg?” Along 
these lines, many analysts view outbound movement from Mexico as a “safety 
valve” for a nation unable to provide for its expanding population. See 
McDonnell, supra note 175. Nonetheless, there were other voices less denun-
ciatory toward Proposition 187. Among them, Mexican television commenta-
tor, Sergio Sarmiento who said “rather than criticizing Proposition 187, we 
must improve our own economic situation, which is the only way we can guar-
antee our people decent jobs.” See Fineman, supra note 194.  
 197. Id. 
 198. Mexico, U.S. Clash, supra note 59. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See supra notes 169–73. 
 201. This contrasts sharply with the American view.  See supra text accom-
panying notes 176–79. 
 202. See supra text accompanying notes 175–87. 
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tions of illegal immigration in the U.S., coupled with claims 
that it is beneficial or necessary to the U.S. economy.203   
Does any of this constitute the promotion of illegal immigra-
tion under the promotion-profit interpretation of FSIA commer-
cial activity?  Point (1) — the Mexican Constitution’s free exit 
guarantees — does not. Mexico may craft constitutional provi-
sions as it sees fit.204  Although the free exit guarantees may be 
irresponsible, as some have suggested,205 such a basis for legal 
action would indeed constitute an unacceptable intervention 
into Mexico’s right to frame its own laws. Point (4) - justifica-
tions of illegal immigration as beneficial — also lacks merit in 
forming the basis for legal action. This is merely advertising a 
viewpoint.  Moreover, some American economists and social 
scientists share that viewpoint.206 
When Mexican officials, however, declare that undocumented 
aliens are not within the U.S. illegally, they are not merely voic-
ing their disagreement with U.S. immigration policy.207  When 
government officials speak, citizens listen.  When, for example, 
the Mexican President states that Mexicans who have crossed 
into the U. S. without documentation are not illegal aliens in 
the U.S.,208 Mexican citizens may draw a sense of legitimacy 
from his authority.  That authority might strengthen the re-
solve of those considering crossing the border into the U.S. 
Likewise, when officials such as Foreign Relations Secretary 
Solana declare that Mexican citizens are free to leave without 
documentation,209 Mexican citizens may be fortified by what 
amounts to a governmental imprimatur on crossing the border 
into the U.S. These and other such statements210 may engender 
a sense of entitlement among Mexican citizens about crossing 
  
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 189–93. 
 204. See PLENDER, supra note 26, at 1.  A nation’s constitutional preferences 
clearly fall under the rubric of a sovereign right.  
 205. See Mexico’s Blind Spot, supra note 185.  “[T]he measure seems to en-
courage Mexican citizens to trample U.S. laws.”  Id.  
 206. See Lee, supra note 41. 
 207. See Mexico Leader, supra note 179. See also Mexico’s Migrant Policy, 
supra note 54.  Mexico’s own policy toward migrants from its southern border 
parallels the American policy, tending to weaken the contention that there is 
genuine disagreement.  Id. 
 208. See supra text accompanying notes 179–83. 
 209. See McDonnell, supra note 175. 
 210. See Thompson, supra note 174. 
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the border.  Such statements may in fact encourage them to 
view the U.S.-Mexican border as an illusory boundary, travers-
able at will. 
While such statements may be imprudent, it is unlikely that 
they would constitute promotion under the promotion-profit 
interpretation of commercial activity.  They do not amount to 
direct encouragement of or interference with U.S. immigration 
law. Moreover, they can always be defended as expressions of 
the Mexican view derived from the Mexican Constitution’s free 
exit guarantees.211  At most, such statements constitute reckless 
rhetoric, best handled through diplomacy. 
If, however, Mexican government officials actively encourage 
their citizens to cross the border without proper documentation, 
such encouragement may in fact constitute promotion.  Such 
encouragement might thus form the basis for legal action under 
the promotion-profit interpretation of FSIA commercial activity. 
The statements of Fernando Solis Camera, head of Mexico’s mi-
gration service, might fall into this category. He declared that 
Mexicans would not be deterred from crossing the border into 
the U.S. This may be construed as an encouragement for Mexi-
can citizens to cross the border into the U.S. in defiance of U.S. 
law.212  This also applies to the statements of Mexican Foreign 
Secretary Jose Angel Gurria. He announced that the govern-
ment was alerting people about the dangers they might encoun-
ter should they attempt to cross.213  Here, a Mexican govern-
ment official is arguably facilitating border crossing with useful 
information.214 One might defend such statements as warnings 
to avoid danger. But this argument is weakened since the object 
of danger and avoidance in question is U.S. border security.215  
These statements may encourage or even facilitate border 
crossings. They form an incipient record of what may constitute 
promotion under the promotion-profit interpretation of FSIA 
commercial activity advocated above. While they do not in 
themselves reach the level of promotion needed to support a 
  
 211. See Vargas, supra note 168. 
 212. See Mexico’s Migration Chief, supra note 187. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Border security is an indubitable product of U.S. sovereign rights.  See 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
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case under the commercial activity exception, they represent 
the building blocks of such a case. 
Indeed, the promotion-profit interpretation of commercial ac-
tivity is an expansion of what has traditionally been understood 
by FSIA commercial activity. Yet it comports with the  principle 
that underlies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity em-
bodied in the FSIA.216 Hence, the promotion-profit interpreta-
tion of FSIA commercial activity may be considered the progeny 
of those traditional notions of commercial activity. As such, it is 
the healthy offspring of our evolving law, preserving and carry-
ing forth the spirit of the parent, adopting that spirit to confront 
the challenges of the times.217 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The burdens of illegal immigration are complex and legion, as 
shown in the earlier portions of this Note.218 It is fitting that a 
nation so burdened would seek relief, accounting for the flurry 
of legislative, legal, and popular initiatives that we have seen in 
the U.S. in the past quarter century. Some argue that these 
measures are tinctured by bigotry or xenophobia; yet even these 
critics are apt to concede that there are legitimate economic and 
social concerns that justify restraining the influx of illegal 
aliens into the U.S. 
Responses to these concerns must consider the needs of ille-
gal aliens. In this regard, it may be unacceptable to deny ser-
vices to illegal aliens, notwithstanding their defiance of U.S. 
immigration laws. These denials are even less acceptable when 
we consider that many illegal immigrants are children and de-
pendents who did not voluntarily migrate, but were conveyed as 
members of larger units. To deny services to these individuals 
offends the humanitarian instincts of the international commu-
  
 216. See supra Part III.D. 
 217. This also conforms to accepted notions of statutory interpretation, par-
ticularly the “statutory purpose” rule whereby a statute is interpreted by re-
lating back to its underlying purpose. In this case, the underlying purpose is 
to restrict the immunity to governmental activities. For an example of this 
method of interpretation in action, albeit in a different legal realm, see Wil-
liam Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of 
Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 48 CATH . U. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1999). 
 218. See supra Part II.B.  
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nity in general,219 and those of the American people in particu-
lar. 
Nonetheless, the state and federal governments within the 
U.S. should try to curb illegal immigration and reduce the costs 
it has engendered. Such is their obligation to the common weal, 
as well as their responsibility to secure the borders. Indeed, the 
need for border security was made painfully clear by the horrors 
of September 11.220 Such too is their duty to relieve the tax-
strained people of fiscal burdens whenever possible. Govern-
ments should be resourceful and creative in their remedial ef-
forts, and should use one of the most elastic institutions avail-
able - the courts. This Note has suggested a template for engag-
ing the courts to this end, with Mexican illegal immigration as a 
paradigm. It has done so in the hope of kindling debate. 
The concept of suing a foreign government to recover costs in-
curred by illegal immigration from its lands based on the com-
mercial activity exception to the FSIA is indeed controversial. 
Pursuing such an action would invoke a host of questions and 
require a careful balancing of interests.221 Nonetheless, the 
principle that promotion-profit represents commercial activity 
is theoretically sound. It embodies the law’s ability to evolve by 
analogy, applying old principles to new contexts. This is cer-
tainly a new context for the FSIA commercial activity exception. 
It is also a viable attempt to reduce the burdens of illegal immi-
gration and should therefore be discussed.222  
In a larger sense, this type of suit is appropriate for any na-
tion confronting illegal immigration, for this is a global phe-
nomenon that grows apace.223 Such suits might encourage na-
  
 219. See, Fineman, supra note 194. 
 220. Edwin Chen, Bush Touts ‘Smart’ Border for U.S. and Mexico, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at A1; Richard Bordreaux, The World Frustration 
Marks Fox, Bush Talks, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, at A3 (noting the shift in 
focus from open borders to border security in the wake of September 11). See 
also Border Arrests, supra, note 66. 
 221. For an explication of such a balancing process, see JOSEPH 
DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 163 
(1988). 
 222. See HUDDLE REPORT, supra note 1. 
 223. See, e.g., Asylum-Seekers Find First World Hard To Get To, IRISH 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2001, at 6, reporting that an estimated 7 million illegal immi-
grants are brought to Europe every year by smugglers (under the legal theory 
propounded above, perhaps the nations of origin could be held accountable for 
failing to restrain these smugglers); Rokas M. Tracevkis, Labor Force Ap-
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tions to respect each other’s borders, and by extension, the laws 
and integrity of one another.  This is arguably a sorely needed 
stimulus.  Furthermore, if governments realized they faced le-
gal action because of promoting illegal immigration, they might 
be stirred to improve conditions within rather than relying on 
the safety valve of outward migration.224  Thus, such legal ac-
tion may benefit not only the countries burdened by illegal im-
migration, but ultimately, their countries of origin as well.  
David M. Turoff * 
  
proaches EU Realm, BALTIC TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
30013071, reporting on Lithuanian citizens deported from Great Britain for 
working illegally in the country; David Sapsted, Refugees Disrupt Freight 
Train Service To France, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 23, 2001, at 8.  The 
channel tunnel had to be suspended to prevent the influx of illegal aliens, at a 
cost of £8 million a week, according to Lord Berkeley, U.K. Rail Freight Group 
chairman.  Tunnel closings have been common due to the influx of illegal 
aliens, delaying exports and undermining the British government’s aim of 
increasing rail freight by 80% in the next decade.  The illegal immigrants 
either ride inside the trains or cling precariously to the outside, and the issue 
has raised tensions between Britain and France; Sharon Labi, Fed: Resolve to 
Keep Pacific Solution is Absolute , AAP News, Dec. 8, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 31342624, noting the flow of illegal immigrants into Australia and the 
Australian attempts to deal with it. 
 224. See comments by Mexican television commentator Sergio Sarmiento, 
supra note 197. 
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